The defensive strategy was to retreat to a more compact and defensible position. The Nephites pulled out of many lands, and took with them their “flocks and their herds, and all their substance.” Thus they practiced a version of the scorched earth policy. They increased the amount of distance between themselves and the Gadiantons, and in that larger space left nothing on which the Gadianton army could feed itself. This ensured that the supply lines of the Gadiantons would become extremely long. An idea of the importance of this extended supply line can be seen by the description of the known logistics of the Aztec army:
“Sixteenth-century records of Indian food consumption place daily adult male rates at around 3,800 calories (approximately .95 kg. or 2.1 lb. of maize). Under normal transport conditions, each porter carried an average load of two arrobas (23 kg. or 50 lb.) per day. And while war would demand that loads be heavier, military conditions limited their size. Because the porters had to carry their burden day after day for the duration of the campaign, the size of their load was limited. They nevertheless provided the army with considerable logistical support through sheer numbers. In the war against Coaixtlahuacan, for example, the Aztec army numbered 200,000 warriors and 100,000 porters, an average of 1 porter for every 2 warriors, or an additional fifty pounds of supplies for every 3 men (2 warriors and 1 porter). Nevertheless, this porter-to-warrior ratio and the above consumption rates meant that the army could travel only eight days if all the porters’ loads were dedicated to food (which they were not).
However, the Aztec army was not dependent solely on its own resources for the journey. Many war supplies flowed into Tenochtitlan as part of subject towns’ tributary obligations, part of which often included providing porters to carry the supplies. But more important was the assistance supplied by towns en route.
Two days before the march messengers were sent to all tributary towns along the designated route to notify them of the army’s coming. From lands set aside to supply goods in war, each town gathered its tribute obligations to support the passing troops, and major towns en route served as focal points for the supplies drawn from other towns within a twenty-league radius. Thus tributaries not only provided supplies but also transported them from the outlying areas. Supplies to feed even a single xiquipilli (8,000 men) for one day amounted to 7,600 kilograms (16,755 lbs.) of maize-330 porter loads-and at a minimum, enough was required to feed the army (warriors and porters) until it reached the next major town. If that town was only twelve miles distant, a single day’s supplies would have been adequate, but if it was twenty-four miles away, the local town’s tribute responsibilities doubled, at least. Consequently, both the actual foodstuffs supplied and the labor transporting it to the transit town were a considerable expense to be absorbed by the local lord.” (Ross Hassig. Aztec Warfare. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1988, p. 64).
Without intervening small towns that could be pressed into porter service, the Gadiantons would have to supply the army directly from the homeland, thus increasing the number of men required to carry the goods, as well as the sheer quantity of material that had to be carried to the front lines. The longer the battle or siege, the more difficult this long supply line would become.