“They Feared to Go to Battle Against the Nephites Lest They Should Lose Their Lives”

Brant Gardner

History: The Book of Mormon provides little information about Lamanite political organization. The general Mesoamerican model, however, can supply some useful context. That model is a confederacy of independent city-states under the general governance of a particular city, within which alliances could and did shift quickly. This picture helps explain the types of problems we see in the Nephite world.

The story of the Anti-Nephi-Lehites suggested a similar political organization among the Lamanites. (See commentary accompanying Alma 24:2, 20.) The political scenario was of cities, each with its king, while an over-king, who was the father of at least two subordinate kings, governed the political alliance. This passage confirms an over-king’s loose control of the city-states under his influence.

Mormon interjects an editorial explanation why some of the Lamanites refused to go to war against the Nephites; but given his perspective four hundred years later and his sources (exclusively Nephite documents), I have some question about the accuracy of his analysis. Certainly this Lamanite refusal came fairly soon after Moroni had inflicted a major defeat on a large Lamanite army; that reason seems logical, but it is very doubtful that Mormon’s sources would have accurately assessed the Lamanite reasons for reluctance. There is simply no historical reason to suppose that the Lamanites discussed their motives with anyone who might have written them into the Nephite record.

The Lamanites Moroni defeated were a combination of Zoramites and Lamanites living near Antionum. This area is a considerable distance from the city of Nephi where Amalickiah conferred with the Lamanite overlord. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the defeated army was officially attached to the Lamanite overlord. It was more probably a regional army attempting to expand its influence.

Mormon records that the over-king decided, on Amalickiah’s representations, to declare war against the Nephites and raise an army from his dependent city-states. Some refuse, thus revealing that the Lamanite overlord’s control was as fragile as Zarahemla’s over some its own dependent city-states. Mesoamerican kings did not have police forces or standing armies to enforce edicts from the central government. The local city-states could and did rebel against the hegemony of the central city in the polity. In such cases, the appropriate response of the over-king was a punitive military action against the rebellious city, as documented in Aztec records.

This is precisely what Mormon records. He does not say whether the rebel Lamanites belong to one city-state or to more. Nevertheless, the general picture of Mesoamerican politics suggests a single city-state. What remains unexplained is why the Lamanite over-king would be so ready to attack the Nephites and why he would so easily trust Amalickiah, a newly arrived Nephite turncoat with obvious personal ambitions.

The overlord in Nephi is either the same king who took the throne when the Lamanites drove out the Anti-Nephi-Lehies or his immediate successor and, hence, of the same lineage. This king was therefore almost certainly connected with apostate Nephites. (See commentary accompanying Alma 24:1, 24:29.) Since apostate Nephites are the first and most ferocious in their desire to conquer the Nephites, a willingness to launch a military expedition against them was virtually built into the over-king’s worldview. As for why he allowed Amalickiah a commanding role in the punitive army sent against the rebellious Lamanites, I argue that Amalickiah, with his ambitions for kingship, probably had a legitimate claim based on his lineage. He thus presents himself to the Lamanite king as a king himself, exiled by usurpers. This form of legitimacy would be respected in the Lamanite world. As a “fellow-apostate,” he might easily win the king’s sympathy, given their mutual detestation of the Nephites. This combination of similar goals and the luster of Amalickiah’s “royal blood,” I argue, explain the Lamanite king’s conferring a military position on him. Having yet another “king” under his political control would have increased the over-king’s prestige.

Second Witness: Analytical & Contextual Commentary on the Book of Mormon, Vol. 4

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