Interestingly, the episode of Korihor is set entirely in a legal context, and from a legal perspective the case of Korihor is marvelously complicated, specific, and detailed. Crucial for understanding the underlying legal issue in the case of Korhior is the opening affirmation in this chapter that “there was no law against a man’s belief” (30:7). But if a person did some culpable action—specifically “[1] if he murdered he was punished unto death; and [2] if he robbed he was also punished; and [3] if he stole he was also punished; and [4] if he committed adultery he was also punished; yea, [5] for all this wickedness they were punished” (30:10). This statement actually derives precisely from King Benjamin’s public law expressed in Mosiah 2:13, which lists exactly the same crimes—[1] murder, [2] plunder [robbery], [3] stealing, [4] adultery, and [5] committing any manner of wickedness—and in the same order. This cannot be accidental, especially if the Nephites were at that very time celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Benjamin’s covenantal giving of that law.
But now, since the decree of Mosiah had provided that a person would be “punished according to the crime which he has committed, according to the law which has been given” (Mosiah 29:15), and since there had been no law given allowing people to be punished for their beliefs but only for “for the crimes which he had done” (30:11), the legal gap that remained open under the law of Mosiah was about speech. Could a person be punished for speech alone? Was speaking an action, which under some circumstances could still be punished—as in the case of blasphemy, or inciting rebellion, or leading people into apostasy—or was all such speaking protected as a mere expression of one’s belief? This was an open legal issue when Korihor came into Zarahemla. But his complicated case, involving speech-acts in Zarahemla, Jershon, Gideon, and heard before judges in Gideon and then in Zarahemla, would make it clear, by divine judgment, that some expressions of belief and accusations went beyond the new protective rubric that a person could not be punished for their beliefs. Keeping one’s beliefs private was always a safe choice, and discussing one’s questions was always an option, and even being critical of how things were being handled could have been acceptable. But when Korihor “went on to blaspheme” (30:30), to “revile against the priests and teachers” (30:31), and to make false accusations (30:32–35), he was effectively found, in this case of first impression, to have gone beyond the protected purview of mere speech, even under the stated law (see Exodus 22:28; Leviticus 24:11; Deuteronomy 5:11). It makes sense that not all speech is protectable in all circumstances. Even today, while we believe in free speech and the First Amendment says you are free to speak, a person cannot falsely yell “fire” in a crowded theater. There are certain speech acts that even our modern law will hold as action.
Although the full legal analysis of this fascinating case goes far beyond the purposes of this installment of notes and comments, it can be said without further elaboration that legal technicalities abound throughout the account found in Alma 30. For many who dig deeply into this material, the amazing fact that all of this is legally consistent with ancient Israelite jurisprudence and judicial process is a great testimony that whoever wrote this account was a sophisticated expert in ancient laws generally and was also personally familiar with the fine points of Nephite legal practice. Alma himself would seem to be the only one who would qualify as the author of this marvelously detailed account. My chapter analyzing this case, in my book cited below and used throughout these notes, discusses technical legal matters such as: expulsion (280), criminal arrest (281), courts, multiple jurisdictions, and venue (282–84), reviling and blasphemy (284), giving notice and warning (285), the problems of a single accuser (286), the requirement of diligent investigation, evidences, and witnesses (286), submission to an ordeal (288), collective responsibility and the “better one than many” rule (288), cursing of an opponent with speechlessness, talionic justice, imposing the inability to speak as matching the crime of speaking unlawfully (289–93), granting an opportunity to confess, taking that confession in writing, and the inadequacy of an incomplete confession (293–95), banishment as an alternative to execution, proclaiming and heralding the result of a court proceeding, giving public warning, and punishment by an act of God (295–98). All of these legal topics are woven smoothly into the narrative fabric that stands behind this legal proceeding and the precedent that was established by this seminal case.
John W. Welch, “The Trial of Korihor,” in The Legal Cases in the Book of Mormon (Provo: BYU Press, 2008), 273–300. The full book is freely available in the Book of Mormon Central Archive.